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ABSTRACT 
Three broad paradigms initially dominated the deliberations among political analysts on what best mode 
of analysis exists when it comes to analyzing political issues and phenomenon. Recent studies however 
reveal that evolving trends of thoughts in political science and generally in the social sciences - with 
regards to the questions above - now exist among contemporary thinkers in the 21
st
 Century. 
Consequently, against the existing institutionalists’, pluralists’ and elitists’ approaches to political 
analysis, contemporary thinkers have proposed the behaviouralists’ and the constructivists’ approaches, 
among other new modes of analysis, as a more empiric method of analysis which increases the scienticity 
of deductions made during political analysis. This study, in the light of the various criticisms presented 
against these new approaches, examines via critical and analytical philosophical methods, all available 
literature on the behaviouralists’ and constructivists’ approaches with the view to identifying the vivid 
imperatives which these new approaches offer researchers in political science and in the social sciences. 
The study concludes that the behaviouralists approach in practice totally embraces all that lends to a 
scientific character. The constructivist approach on the other hand takes into consideration the various 
complexities that now exist in human phenomenon. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Recent studies conducted in the direction of finding 
pathways to further understanding modern political thought 
and behaviour, revealed that trends of thoughts have moved 
from the initial focus on the tree broad paradigms or 
approaches which initially dominated the discuss amongst 
political analysts and   thinkers, on the subject of what best 
mode of analysis there are when it comes to analyzing 
political issues and phenomenon in the twentieth and twenty 
first century. The paradigms or approaches initially in 
perspectives include: Institutionalism, Pluralism and Elitism. 
These paradigms reflect to a certain degree, different 
ontological and epistemological positions in the study of 
politics. However, it is important to note that the focus of their 
enquiry and their differences were more directed at the level 
of analytical division. The institutionalists for instance, 
directed their analytic efforts to constitutions and institutional 
issues only. For the pluralist on the other hand, their focus was 
to be on groups and bargaining. For The elitists however, their 
focus was on elites and power.  
 Studies also revealed that the three main approaches 
mentioned above were to a large extent, ridden with various 
challenges with regards to analyzing political issues. The old 
institutionalists approach for instance was known to be 
characterized by a focus on formal rules and organization 
rather than the informal conventions and on official structures 
of government rather than broader institutional networks of 
governance. 
[1]
 As such, the institutionalists approach was 
often perceived as structuralist in the sense that it held that 
structures determine political behaviour in the same way that 
the legalist see law as having a major role in governing. This 
same approach were also perceived to assume functionalists 
roles and tendencies in that, there were some assumptions that 
principal institutions were always perceived to be present 
because the help the political system to work well. Studies in 
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the past have therefore revealed that understanding the 
constitutional and institutional basis of different forms of 
government is not a bad starting point when it comes to 
political analysis and political science but the whole approach 
has increasingly found itself ridden under so many challenges. 
 A number of recent literature are unanimous in their 
resolve of the need to look beyond the formal arrangements of 
power in the light of the above mentioned approaches in other 
to understand politics. It was already clear that the division 
within political science have gotten more varied and also more 
profound. They had moved beyond the status of analytical 
differences to take into account different ontological and 
epistemological positions. These differences were mostly in 
the areas of (1) what to study, (2) How to study, (3) and the 
why of the study. Therefore in responding positively to the 
contemporary questions that now looms political scientist in 
the face, thinkers and recent political analysts are of the 
opinion that “ In other to explore these broad approaches that 
political scientists adopt in their recent works, we will need to 
step outside the confines of the earlier mentioned approaches: 
(Institutionalism, Pluralism and Elitism)  which presently are 
known to have so many complications, and explore the new 
approaches which political scientists now adopt in their daily 
study and investigations.  
 This paper shall therefore explore two new 
approaches to political analysis: (The Behavioralists Approach 
also known Behaviouralism and the Constructivist 
Approaches, which is also known as Constructivism) with the 
view to first identifying the philosophical foundations of these 
approaches to the study of political analysis. We shall 
ultimately identify and state the relevance and significances of 
these approaches - if any- to the study of modern political 
science and political analysis. 
 For methods, the paper shall adopt the method of 
conceptual analysis to clarify the major concepts in the paper: 
(Behaviouralism, Constructivism). The reconstructive 
methods of philosophy shall be employed to synthesize the 
existing basic elements of the behaviouralists’ and the 
constructivists’ modes of thought with the view to establishing 
the existing relevance of the approaches in the light of the 
subject of this paper. At the end of the study, we shall be 
offering a critical analysis of the relevance of both approaches 
to the study of modern political science.   
 
2. MAIN FEATURES & FOUNDATIONS OF 
BEHAVIOURALISM 
   
2.1. Historical Background to The Study of 
Behaviouralism 
 Behaviouralism rose partly as a reaction against the 
traditional approaches of political inquiry and partly as a result 
of the quest in search for a more ‘Scientific’ knowledge about 
politics. Consequently, political scientists have in recent times, 
come out with a variety of approaches to meet their needs. The 
first breakthrough came with the emergence of the 
‘Behavioralists Movement’ in political science. 
 Behaviouralism, or the behavioural approach to the 
analysis and explanation of political phenomena, is 
particularly associated with the work of American political 
scientists after the Second World War, but its origins can be 
traced back to the works of Graham Wallas (Human Nature in 
Politics) and Arthur Bentley (The Process of Government), 
both published as early as 1908. Both Wallas and Bentley 
were inclined to lay greater emphasis on the informal 
processes of politics and less on political institutions in 
isolation. Wallas sought to introduce a New Realism in 
political studies in the light of new findings in Contemporary 
Psychology. The new psychology had revealed that man was 
not totally a rational creature and that his political actions 
were not totally guided by reason and self interest. Wallas 
therefore insisted on exploring facts and evidence for 
understanding human nature and its manifestations in human 
behavior. 
 Arthur Bentley, on the other hand, a pioneer of group 
approach to politics, primarily sought not to describe political 
activity, but to provide a set of new tools of investigation in 
the social sciences. Greatly inspired by Sociology, he 
proceeded to undertake a study of the role of pressure groups, 
political parties, elections and public opinion in the political 
process. 
 Charles E. Merriam was another pioneer of the 
behavioural approach. He is also famous as the founder of the 
‘Chicago School’ which made substantial contribution to the 
Behavioralists movement. In the article ‘The Present State of 
The Study Of Politics’ published in American Political 
Science Review (1921) and in his book ‘New Aspects of 
Politics’ (1925), Merriam criticized contemporary political 
science for its lack of scientific rigour. In his presidential 
address to American ‘Political Science Association’ (1925), 
Merriam exhorted political scientists to look at political 
behaviour as one of the essential objects of inquiry. 
 George E. Catlin in his ‘Science and Method of 
Politics’ (1927) advanced the case for a value-free pure 
science. He treated ‘power’ as the essence of politics and 
argued that analysis of power should not be inclined in favour 
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of any particular value-system. Harold D. Lasswell, (1902-78), 
in his celebrated work ‘Politics: Who Gets What, When and 
How’ (1936) proved to be a landmark in the empirical 
approach to politics as the study and analysis of power. 
 Despite these early attempts, Behaviouralism in 
political science was systematically developed only after the 
Second World War, particularly through the writings of 
American Political Scientists. David B. Truman, Robert Dahl, 
Evron M. Kirkpatrick, David Easton, Heinz Eulau; are some 
of the most prominent personalities of the Behavioral 
movement in political science. 
 Behaviouralism as such came to be understood as 
something wider than the study of political behaviour, yet 
political behaviour was its main focus. Behaviouralism as a 
movement in political science did not remain confined to the 
study of individual based political behaviour, but developed 
into a set of orientations, procedures and methods of analysis. 
In practice, it embraced all that lends a scientific character to 
the modern political science. According to David Easton,
 [2]
 
the intellectual foundations of Behaviouralism consist of eight 
major tenets: 
1. Regularities: Discoverable uniformities in political 
behaviour which can be expressed in theory-like 
statements. 
2. Verification: Validity of such theory like statements 
can be verified. 
3. Techniques: Means for acquiring and interpreting 
data. 
4. Quantification: Precision in the recording of data. 
5. Values: Objective scientific inquiry has to be value 
free or value neutral. 
6. Systematization: Close interrelationship between 
theory and research. 
7. Pure Science: Directed towards forging a link 
between theoretical understanding of politics and 
application of theory to practical problem- solving. 
8. Integration: Integration of political science with other 
social sciences. 
Thus Behaviouralism came to accord primacy to higher degree 
of reliability vis-à-vis higher degree of generality. In short, 
Behaviouralism focused on micro level situations rather than 
attempting macro level generalizations.  
 
2.2. Conceptual Clarifications and Analysis of 
Behaviouralism  As a Mode of Thought 
 Behaviouralism is not a clearly defined movement for 
those who are thought to be behaviouralists. It is more clearly 
definable by those who were opposed to it, because they were 
describing it in terms of the things within the newer trends that 
they found objectionable. Consequently, some would define 
behaviouralism as an attempt to apply the methods of natural 
sciences to human behavior. Others would define it as an 
excessive emphasis upon quantification. Others conceive of it 
as individualistic reductionism. From the inside, the 
practitioners were of different minds as to what it was that 
constituted behaviouralism.  By this we can see that from 
inception, behaviouralism resisted a single definition. Dwight 
Waldo emphasized that behaviouralism itself is unclear, 
calling it "complicated" and "obscure."
[3]
 Easton agreed, 
stating, "Every man puts his own emphasis and thereby 
becomes his own behaviouralist" as such, attempts to 
completely define behaviouralism have been fruitless.
[4]  
So 
instead of defining behaviouralism, it is much easier to say 
what behaviouralism does or seeks to achieve.  
Behaviouralism seeks to examine “the behavior, actions, and 
acts of individuals – rather than the characteristics of 
institutions such as legislatures, executives, and judiciaries – 
and groups in different social settings and explain this 
behavior as it relates to the political system 
[5] 
For Britannica encyclopedia, 
[6] 
Behaviouralism is the view 
that the subject matter of political science should be limited to 
phenomena that are independently observable and 
quantifiable. It assumes that political institutions largely 
reflect underlying social forces and that the study of politics 
should begin with society, culture, and public opinion. To this 
end, behaviouralists utilize the methodology of the social 
sciences — primarily psychology — to establish statistical 
relationships between independent variables (presumed 
causes) and dependent variables (presumed effects). For 
example, behaviouralists might use detailed election data to 
argue that voters in rural areas are likely to vote for Mr. ‘A’ 
and not Mr. ‘B’ as a result of so and so reasons.  
 The behavioural approach to social science and 
political analysis, in all, are guided by two distinctive 
principles: these principles have been known to differentiate 
the behaviouralist from other social sciences. These principles 
include: their insistence on the mere fact that observable 
behaviour, whether it be at the level of the individual or the 
social aggregate, should be the focus of their analysis at any 
point in time. They also insist that any explanation offered for 
that behaviour should be susceptible to empirical testing. In all 
these divers contexts, the central questions which the 
behaviouralists seeks to answer are quite clear and simple. In 
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Sanders’ own words, [7] “What do actors involved actually do? 
How can we best explain why they do it?” while we know that 
these are not just the only questions that behaviouralist tackle, 
they however in fact believe that as far as behaviouralists are 
concerned, they believe that these two questions are the most 
important ones when it comes to analyzing issues in political 
science. 
2.3. Some Major Characteristics of Behaviouralism   
  One of the most outstanding features of the 
behavioural approach is the fact that its philosophical origins 
are found in the writings of August Comte 
[8]
 (Comte, 1947) of 
the 19
th
 Century and also in the Logical Positivism of the 
Vienna Circle in the 1920’s. These philosophical foundations 
held that analytical statements made about the physical or 
social world falls into one of the following categories:  
a. That such statement can only amount to useful 
tautologies, i.e. that they could be purely definitional 
statements that assign a specific meaning to a 
particular phenomenon or concept. 
b. Statements could be empirical, that is to say, they 
could be tested against observations in other to see if 
they were true or false. 
c. Statements that fall into neither of the first two 
categories were devoid of analytical meaning. For the 
positivist in short, meaningful analysis could only 
proceed only on the basis of useful tautologies and 
empirical statements: Metaphysics, Theology, 
Aesthetics, and Ethics merely introduce meaningless 
obfuscation into the process of inquiry. 
 It is important to note however, that behaviouralism 
as an approach in political science did not entirely adopt all 
the philosophical precepts of the positivist thought. The 
precepts which were known to have been one of the major 
reasons for which Logical Positivism have attracted various 
attacks’ from other opposing schools of thought. This 
notwithstanding, Sanders 
[9]
 notes that the behaviouralist view 
of the nature of empirical theory and explanation were 
strongly influenced by the positivist tradition. That stated, we 
wish to note that the behaviouralists insistence on empirical 
observation and testing of all theories etc, is what have earned 
the approach its characteristic feature for which the 
behavioural approach to social enquiry is known for today.   
 
2.4. Analysis of Some Criticism of Behaviouralism 
 
 These distinguishing characteristics for which the 
behavioural approach is known, has in recent times, attracted 
various criticisms from all and sundry. One of the major 
criticisms of the behavioural approach rests on the fact of 
association and influence which the Logical Positivist school 
of thought exerts on the behavioural approach. This positivist 
influence claims that statements which are neither definitions 
nor empirical are meaningless in its entire ramification. By 
implication, it has been argued by certain scholars that since 
the behavioral approach share the same mode of thought with 
logical positivism, it invariably becomes vulnerable to any 
weakness inherent in positivism.  
 
 We have already inferred in the sections above that 
these scenario may not necessary follow or apply with the 
behaviouralists approach. This is because among the large 
class of statements that the positivist declare to be 
‘meaningless’ contains in fact,  many ideas that can add very 
significantly to our understanding of social behaviour and the 
human condition. Where positivism seeks to exclude these 
forms of reflections as means through which human behaviour 
can be analyzed, it will amount to great error. As such, in 
these recent times, we have had contemporary behaviouralist 
researchers reject the notion that there can be no role for 
normative theory, aesthetics or hermeneutics in political and 
social analysis. They would argue instead that these 
approaches yield a different form of knowledge or 
understanding but not that they are ‘meaningless’.    
 Another major criticism against the behaviouralist 
approach is that there is a tendency amongst the 
behaviouralist, to tilt towards mindless empiricism as a result 
of their influence on positivism. David Sanders 
[10]
 again 
reports that one of the earliest claims of the positivists was that 
theoretical understanding could be obtained only through the 
process of inquiry that began with theory free observations of 
all the facts in an experiment for instance, from which law like 
generalizations are derived from the empirical regularities that 
were observed. Later positivist like Hempel 
[11]
 and Popper 
were known to have argued strongly that “enquiries could only 
proceed if the researchers’ effort to observe ‘relevant facts’ 
where guided either by clear theoretical expectations or, at a 
minimum, by some kind of explanatory hunch’” the positivist 
by this position, moves away from Inductivism as a method of 
science. 
 But on the contrary, we see the behaviouralists’ 
emphasis of data and the concomitant downgrading of apriori 
theoretical reasoning which in turn produce specific 
tendencies among behavioural researchers. One of which is 
the tendency to emphasize on what can easily be measured 
rather than what might be theoretically important. The 
tendency to play down on the potential importance of 
phenomena that are intrinsically difficult to measure has thus 
become the matter of concern to both critics and advocates of 
behavioural research. This scenario has been exceptionally 
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true in relation to the analysis of electoral behaviour. 
Behaviouralists now thus pay closer attention to issues such as 
“electorate’s social profiles’, partisan identifications, policy 
preferences and economic perceptions. To this end, complex 
models have been devised to aid showing how the relative 
importance and causal ordering of different aspects of various 
phenomena influence the determination of a vote during and 
after elections. 
 
3. MAIN FEATURES & FOUNDATIONS OF  
CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
3.1. Conceptual Clarifications and Analysis of The 
Constructivist Mode of Thought. 
 According to Craig Parson 
[12]
 ,  A constructivist 
argument simply holds that “people do one thing and not the 
other due to certain ‘social constructs’: ideas, beliefs, norms, 
identities or some other interpretative filters through which 
people perceive  the worlds” by this, it means that the world 
we inhabit in is in fact a ‘world of our making’ [13] . It also 
means that the actions that individuals take at any point in 
time are structured by the meanings that particular groups of 
people develop to interpret and organize their identities, 
relationships and environment. 
 By implication, None-constructivist scholarship, on 
the contrary, suggests that our interpretative filters do not 
greatly affect how we act, instead we inhabit a real landscape 
of features like geography, resources and relative power, to 
which we respond fairly directly. Typical examples of the 
groups that fall into this class include: “The Behaviouralists 
Approaches”, “The Rational Choice Approaches” and “The 
Marxian or Marxist Approach”. Let us also note that some 
institutionalists also make none constructive arguments though 
other institutionalists tend to overlap with constructivism. 
Therefore, the main feature of the constructivists approach in 
this study is that whenever we are able to establish a case 
where subjective interpretations of some sort exists, we are 
clearly known to be responsible for influencing or affecting 
the way people behave or react to both internal and external 
factors, then and only then can we establish the existence of 
the constructivist approach.  
 Let us at this point note that constructivists have been 
known to vary epistemologically by virtue of how they think 
their claims relate to reality, science and causality. They have 
also been known to vary substantively and methodologically 
as well. In other words, just as there are many different 
behaviouralist claims, so also there are many constructivist 
claims. This is because there are different levels of action 
which they all tend to address from world culture.     
3.2. Historical Background To The Study of 
Constructivism 
 The basic notions of constructivism originated along 
side with the discipline of sociology in the late 19
th
 Century as 
contained in the notable works of Durkheim. 
[14]
 Durkheim 
was known to have posited that Human societies are held 
together by the ‘social fact’ of culture. This means that every 
particular society creatively inverts different socially 
constructed identities and beliefs which guide their mode of 
thinking every now and then.  
 Another very important reference that ought to be 
made here with regards to the foundations of constructivism is 
the notable works of a German Sociologist, Marx Webber. He 
suggests that ideas are like ‘switchmen’ which often 
‘determine the tracks along which actions have been pushed 
by the dynamics of interest’ [15]. For example, Marx Webber 
was known to have argued in one of his famous works: The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, that “it was the 
religious ideas of Protestantism that lead indirectly to the rise 
of capitalism”. [16] This claim ‘turned Marx on his head’ 
reversing Marx’s view that ideas and ideology are just 
rationalizations that people make up as they pursue wealth and 
power in a material world. For Marx Webber, ideas and 
culture deeply define what people see as their ‘interests’. It is 
important to note that Durkheim and Webber’s focus on the 
impact of socially-constructed ideas, norms and culture first 
entered the emerging discipline of political science mainly 
through the works of the scholar who first translated Webber 
into English, Talcott Parsons, a Professor in Sociology in the 
University of Harvard. The best known example was the Civic 
Culture, Almond and Veba. 
[17]
  
 Other notable thinkers who have influenced work in 
constructivism include: in continental Europe; we have 
theorist like, Derrida, 
[18]
 Michel Foucault, 
[19] 
Lacan 
[20] 
who 
advanced what together became known as “poststructuralist or 
‘postmodern’ constructivism. By the turn of the millennium, 
constructivism was better established in political science than 
ever.  Scholars of social construction from all these lineage 
held prestigious faculty positions and published in highly 
regarded avenues. One hand, the thriving variety in 
constructivism was a sign of strength: much like the many 
different rational-choice theories, the many different kinds of 
constructivist arguments displayed the rich range of tools and 
logic that could be developed out of its basic insights. 
3.3. Some Major features and Characteristics of 
Constructivism. 
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 As mentioned before, “the distinctiveness of 
constructivism lies in its attention to interpretation in human 
action” [21] it has also been argues that a focus on social 
construction connects to even deeper kinds of distinctiveness 
that locates constructivism in its own realm of reality. 
 Wendt, 
[22]
 a man considered to have attempted to 
represent the standers of the constructivist approach, have 
argued that traditional causal-explanatory relationship asks 
‘why’ questions about how one set of conditions dynamically 
produce another, whereas constructivist-styles scholarship 
asks ‘how or what’ questions about the static properties that 
constitute things. Culture, norms, ideas, and identities do not 
usually cause things in a dynamic, one-thinking-knocks-into-
another way; instead, they define the properties of the 
properties of the world we perceive. For example, Wendt 
notes that it doesn’t make sense to say that the norms of 
sovereignty preceded and caused the rise of the modern state 
system. In essence for Wendt, most constructivist pursue a 
different kind of inquiry from none constructivist. 
 By the above, Wendt goes on to underscore the fact 
that ‘constitutiveness’ is indeed central to constructivism. The 
deepest point of constructivism is that the natural world is 
meaningless and indeterminate for human beings until we 
begin to socially construct some shared meanings about it. 
Constructivists therefore believe that it is social constructions 
and not organizational landscape that makes the greatest 
difference in how we ultimately act. 
 When claims are made about social construction, we 
do not just make claims about static ‘deonitic’ powers of ideas 
and norms, but when such claims are made, they are made 
about a process by which people construct themselves into 
those idea and norms. 
3.4. Analysis of Some Criticism of Constructivism 
 Just as we have identified series of variations in the 
approach discussed above (Behaviouralism), we wish to report 
that further studies have also revealed that the constructivist 
approach have been perceived to be plagued with various 
other variations of the constructivist mode of thought. Much 
of the preceding arguments have been about epistemological 
issues: debates about how to define ‘explanation’ and the 
relationship between causality and constitutiveness are debates 
about how we acquire knowledge about the world. But part of 
the points that has been argued is that constructivism is not 
necessarily distinctive in epistemological terms. Many 
constructivists however part-ways with none-constructivist in 
epistemological terms. The distinction between those who do 
and those who do not is the most common distinction 
emphasized in surveys of constructivism, between modern 
constructivist and ‘post-modern’ constructivist. [23]  
3.4.1 Different methods 
 One of the resultant consequences of the variances 
that have been discovered to exist in the constructivist mode 
of thought is the fact that different methods are introduced into 
constructivism. The methods with which constructivist specify 
and support their claims are almost as diverse as the 
arguments they make. The choices that constructivist make in 
methods connect most strongly to the kind of constructivism 
in which they are trained, which invariably carries with it, a 
certain kind of methodological training as well. For instance, 
constructivist with ‘International Relations’ training usually 
under take close process-tracing over time to show how 
certain ideas or norms inform certain actions.  This constant 
change in methods is responsible for the reasons for the series 
of objections that have been raised against constructivism as a 
current and most appropriate method of analyzing current 
political phenomena. 
3.4.2. Different mechanisms and different social 
constructs 
 Beyond the abstract epistemological difference that 
the constructivist display, constructivists have also been 
known to vary even more widely in terms of concrete 
arguments they make about how social construction works. In 
the opinion of Craig parsons, “one of the clearest kinds of 
distinction lies in the kind of mechanism that different 
scholars portray in the process of social construction.” [24] He 
also noted that the mechanism the scholars emphasize on; go a 
long way to evoke different views of the results of social 
construction, by this we mean, how people relate to the social 
constructs around them. Socializations and Persuasion has 
been identified as some of the main mechanisms that have 
influenced the variations in constructivism. We shall not be 
going into that in this presentation as it shall be a subject for 
another paper. 
 
4 THE RELEVANCE OF THE BEHAVIOURALISTS 
& THE CONSTRUCTIVISTS  APPROACH TO 
THE STUDY OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE   
4.1. The Relevance of Behaviouralism to Modern Political 
Science 
 From all the studies done in the above sections and 
those not captured in this paper, it is evident that one of the 
reasons for the emergence of the behavioral approach is to 
         July 2013. Vol. 2, No.3                                                                                           ISSN 2307-227X            
      International Journal of Research In Social Sciences    
                                                           © 2013 IJRSS & K.A.J. All rights reserved                
                             www.ijsk.org/ijrss                                                                                                                                 
 
69 
 
create an avenue which will project the methods of analysis 
adopted and practiced in political science as against the 
seeming advances in the methods that are recorded and 
practiced in other social science disciplines like sociology and 
psychology. 
[25] 
Consequently, behaviouralists, being 
dissatisfied with the traditionalists’ opinions about issues like 
individual participation and political systems in general, 
resolved to make scientific methodology and research 
orientation the new hall-mark of political science 
These explain why the behavioural school has consistently 
sought to make political science very quantitative and 
scientific and, why they have placed emphasis on micro 
politics (i.e. study of political actors and process) – rather than 
the formal institutions of government” [26]  
 
 These efforts by the behaviouralists in my view 
constitute nothing but desire for improvement and scientific 
rejuvenation of political science. This is attested to by the 
‘Creed of Behaviouralism’ or, the key ‘behaviouralists’ 
articles of faith’ [27]   According to the behavioural creed or 
articles of faith:  
 
Capability of scientific 
prediction and explanation 
is not beyond the scope of 
political science if 
political scientists engage 
in search of political 
behaviours and their 
accompanying variables. 
And that observable 
phenomenon should be the 
only concern of political 
science as opposed to 
institutionalism. 
[27] 
 
 Generally, the birth of the behavioural approach has 
consistently led to the genesis of scientific research into 
variables like “political attitudes, role perception, voting 
behaviours, pressure groups, roles of leaders and elites, 
individual and group behaviors and their interaction within the 
system.” [28] In short, the rise of this approach within the 
discipline of political science has brought with it, sophisticated 
concepts and scientifically sophisticated tools of analysis and 
evaluation like “tables, graphs, scales, charts statistical and 
mathematical models” [29] 
 
 With these, behaviouralism or the behavioral 
approach (to my mind) was and still is a new thinking about 
the methodological approach in political science. It has 
propelled the discipline into a new direction of intellectual 
inquiry and pursuit of knowledge by charting a new 
intellectual channel with a capacity to grapple with all issues 
relating to political phenomena of the past and present 
dispensation. In other words, it has made political science 
more attuned to the changing needs of people and the study of 
politics within a polity. 
 
 Because of the perceived impact of behaviouralism to 
political science (though this is debatable), we would argue 
that behaviouralism is a form of renaissance, - if not in totality 
- of certain parts of political science. The debate-ability of 
behaviouralism’s impact on political science is exemplified by 
the views of some of the behaviouralist themselves. For 
example while accepting the idea that behaviouralism has had 
pronounced impact on political science, Robert Dalh was 
cautious when making reference to the subject by referring to 
it as “‘the scantiness’ of behaviouralism impact” [30]. But, on 
the other hand, Heinz Eulau seems to be firm about the impact 
of behaviouralism on political science when he opined that: 
 
The behavioural 
penetration of political 
science has had the effect 
of vitalizing and 
improving the older forms 
of writing and research. It 
has had a salutary 
influence on the quality of 
all political science
 [31]
  
 
 The fact that behaviouralism, since its emergence 
into the social science arena and more specifically, into the 
discipline of political, science as an approach to political 
analysis - instead of disappearing - has continued to reinforces 
its indelible impact on political science, It has becoming a fact 
that cannot be over emphasized.  Its mere continuation and 
existence is an incentive to the pursuit of knowledge. We are 
therefore resolved to infer that behaviouralism or the 
behavioural approach is an antithesis of traditional political 
philosophy. Its emphasis on scientific methods and empiricism 
as opposed to traditional political philosophy justifies this 
assertion. 
 
 Whether the synthesis is about to emerge or has 
emerged in the form of post behaviouralism, as often observed 
by the critics of the approach, is indeed a different topic not 
covered by the scope of the present paper. However, this study 
notes that despite its impact on political science, 
behaviouralism has suffered a sort of erosion of wide 
recognition and acceptability in terms of the criticisms levied 
against it so far. These criticism notwithstanding, the approach 
has survived to date due to the evolutionary pattern of human 
society and its accompanying complexities which necessitate a 
corresponding sophistication in the knowledge of intellectuals 
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whose expertise are needed to meet the challenges of these 
complexities. 
 
4.2. The Relevance Constructivism to Modern Political 
Science 
 As highlighted in our arguments so far, 
constructivism is a broad form of argument built on the notion 
that people only arrive at certain actions due to their adoption 
of certain social constructs to interpret their world. By 
implication, such a method therefore provides a distinct 
substantive view of how and why the political world forms 
and ‘hangs together’ to the ordinary person. This approach 
might be conceived as just another additional approach 
alongside the traditional, Marxian, Institutional, or Realist 
approach that emerges to meet a particular cause of action. But 
the truth is that social constructs are not just another kind of 
cause. There is more to it than meets the eye. 
 
 Constructivism as an approach to political analysis 
emerged into the political arena due to some complexities of 
the human phenomenon. Such complexities takes into 
consideration, the fact that everybody has an opinion which to 
a large extent, has its own individual merits that must be given 
due consideration at each point in time. Opinions that are 
birthed from deeply enshrined values that would reduce the 
individual to nothing when disregarded. The opinions that 
simply demands that an entirely new cause of action be 
created in other to be able to adequately explain new realities 
that unfolds in daily political life and activities. The opinions 
that occasionally demands that new and better yardsticks be 
formulated from what formerly existed in other to adequately 
account for new and complex realities in the political arena. 
The opinions that takes into consideration, the multiplicity of 
identities and how these identities constitute the basis for the 
development of new constructs to met up with  current trends 
and changing realities. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 Now because these realities are splinters which are 
typical to each individual actor in the political sphere, who 
subsequently are also  products of social agents working on 
other social, linguistic, ethnic and social identities in time, the 
need  therefore arise for developing new paradigms and 
construct to meet each rising need and demand. The 
emergence of the behaviouralists and the constructivist 
approach to studies and analysis in the field of politics is 
indeed a fact, I believe and submit, cannot be overemphasized 
here in this paper. While affirming that the behaviouralists 
approach in practice have embraced all that lends a scientific 
character to the modern political science methods as captured 
in their eight major tenets, constructivism or the 
constructivists approach has via its new ideology and methods 
of approach, have been able to meet the complex demand in 
the modern political era. The numerous advantages of the 
application of these approaches (Behaviouralism & 
Constructivism) to modern political analysis have made 
modern political analysts to have the upper hand with regards 
to the process involved in political analysis.          
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